Trump–Nigeria military intervention: Is it lawful under international law?

INTRODUCTION

The friendly relations between the United States and Nigeria have deteriorated rapidly, following accusations from President Donald Trump that Nigerian authorities have failed to act—or are complicit—in what they describe as the mass killing of Christians.

Tensions had been building for months as the White House itself, accused the Nigerian government of tolerating or enabling what some have labelled an attempted “genocide” of Christians. The situation escalated dramatically on 31 October 2025, when Trump designated Nigeria a Country of “Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act, opening the door to stronger measures ranging from diplomatic pressure to sanctions.

Trump has intensified his stance—threatening to cut off all U.S. aid to Nigeria, directing the Pentagon to “prepare for possible action” in what he called “that now disgraced country,” and promising to “go in… ‘guns-a-blazing’” for a “fast, vicious and sweet” operation if Nigeria failed to stop Islamist killings. His secretary of state, Marco Rubio, endorsed the directive, while defence secretary Pete Hegseth (Secretary of War) declared that the U.S. was preparing for action: either Nigeria protects Christians or the U.S. will target the Islamic militants responsible. On 3 November 2025, Trump reiterated his claim that Christians are being killed “in very large numbers,” suggesting potential U.S. military options ranging from airstrikes to ground incursions.

The Trump administration’s threat of military intervention to halt the alleged slaughter has drawn sharp resistance from Abuja, which insists that Nigeria’s territorial integrity must be respected.

This article assesses President Trump’s actions in light of the rules of international law. It examines whether his conduct amounts to a violation of established principles and norms governing the use of force and foreign intervention.

II. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE KELLOGG BRIAND PACT ON THE USE OF FORCE

In the aftermath of the First World War, the international community began pursuing mechanisms to regulate the use of force between states. This initiative resulted in the founding of the League of Nations in 1919,  the very first intergovernmental political organization in world history. The League Covenant established the League of Nations.[1] This was one of the arrangements in the series of peace treaties concluded at Versailles and elsewhere during 1919-1920.[2] The League Covenant was signed and ratified by most of the States in existence at the time.[3]   

The system was built on a cornerstone that appeared, at first glance, to be a total prohibition of war. Member states specifically accepted "obligations not to resort to war" to ensure peace.[4] The Covenant's prohibition against war was neither strict nor absolute. Instead, it functioned as a procedural delay: it mandated a three-month cooling-off period during which parties were obliged to pursue peaceful dispute resolution, such as arbitration, judicial settlement, or intervention by the League's Council.[5]

The 1919 League Covenant did not really prohibit the use of force by States. Article 10 provides that:

“The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”

This provision served two functions. First, it discouraged states from attacking each other, though this was a non-binding recommendation, not a strict prohibition. The wording made it clear that states could easily ignore this guideline. Second, it required any state that was attacked to consult the League's Executive Council on its response. This Council was the League's highest decision-making body.[6]

During the League of Nations era, numerous efforts were made to close the loopholes in this new international law. The most significant of these was the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 1928.[7] Originally signed by fifteen states,[8] it ultimately gained sixty-three signatories and remains in force today. In the pact, the signatory states solemnly declared, on behalf of their peoples, that they "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."[9]

Article 1 of 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact[10] states that:

“The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”

Once again, the language did not establish a true prohibition. To "renounce" war is not the same as "prohibiting" it; renunciation is a voluntary abandonment that could be reversed without immediate legal penalty. Furthermore, the Pact only applied to a formal declaration of "war," leaving lower-level uses of force legally ambiguous. Combined with the total absence of an enforcement mechanism, these weaknesses rendered the Pact ineffective in practice.[11]

These two charters failed to prevent the Second World War. The reasons why the League Covenant and the 1928 Pact failed to prohibit the use of force can be summarized as follows:[12]

(a) The Covenant and the Pact did not prohibit the use of force, but merely put pressure on States not to resort to it.

(b) None of the treaties provided State parties with the right of self-defence.

(c) There were no sanctions against defaulters. Therefore, State parties to the treaties did not feel any significant pressure to respect the rules.

(d) Not all States participated in the League or the Pact. The USA never joined the League, despite signing up to its Covenant, and the (then) Soviet Union never signed the Kellogg–Briand Pact and was expelled from it.

III. THE UN CHARTER ON THE USE OF FORCE

The end of the Second World War was the birth of the United Nations. Determined

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained the UN Charter was signed.[13]

The primary focus of the conferences establishing the United Nations was regulating the use of force by states. One of the most important principles of international law is the prohibition against the use of force. This rule is codified in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter(UN Charter). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter[14] provides that:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

It is generally accepted that Article 2(4) is customary law and forms a part of jus 

cogens norms.[15] The prevailing interpretation among scholars and states is that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits only military force.[16] Proponents of this view base their position on two key arguments. First, they contend that since the UN was established in the aftermath of the Second World War, the term "force" must refer to the type of armed aggression that characterized that conflict. As Yoram Dinstein states, "when studied in context, the term 'force' in Article 2(4) must denote armed—or military—force."[17] Secondly, the history of the negotiation of the UN supports this view.[18]

Although Article 2(4) is still interpreted as prohibiting only military force, the United Nations has explicitly condemned economic coercion as an unacceptable means of compelling a state. This is seen in the The UN General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, confirmed by General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970 (the Friendly Relations Resolution).[19] The purpose of this article is not to find the other meaning of force. This article adopts a narrow definition of 'force,' confining its analysis specifically to the use of military force or armed force.

A. Use of Force Against Territorial Integrity and Political Independence

Territorial integrity and political independence are the twin pillars of statehood. Territorial integrity is the principle that a state's land, territorial sea, and seabed are inviolable and whole, forming the physical basis of its sovereignty. Political independence is a state's right to autonomous governance, free from external coercion in its domestic and foreign policy. Together, these principles guarantee a state's sovereign control over its territory and its freedom to make independent political decisions, forming the foundation for its recognition by the international community.[20]

The founders of the United Nations, keenly aware that territorial issues had caused World War II, were determined to protect state sovereignty. They therefore emphasized the critical importance of territorial integrity and political independence. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, the initial draft of Article 2(4) was narrowly constructed, prohibiting only the "use or threat of force in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization."[21] However, this formulation was strengthened at the San Francisco Conference following lobbying by smaller nations, who sought a explicit guarantee against powerful states using force against them. Consequently, the defining phrase "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" was inserted.[22]

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits member states to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. All states are under an international legal obligation not to commit any  violation of the independence, or territorial or personal authority, of any other  state.

Article 2(7) of the UN Charter forbids the UN to interfere in matters occurring within the domestic jurisdiction of its member States. It provides that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter…” These provisions fortifies the concept of territorial integrity and political independence. 

The infringement of a state's 'political independence' is readily identifiable in acts of foreign coercion—be it the use of force, subversion, or other pressures that control its political organs.[23] An an example of such actions brought before the United Nations is the maintenance of foreign troops on a state's territory contrary to the host government's consent. Consequently, territorial integrity and political independence are mutually reinforcing. They are inseparable endowments of every state, jointly constituting the essential foundations of sovereignty in the international system.

The concept of territorial integrity and political independence formed the major part of the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970).[24] The preamble of the Friendly Relations Resolution repeatedly emphasizes the principles of territorial integrity and political independence. It does so in three key ways: first, by recalling the duty of states to refrain from any form of coercion against these principles; second, by affirming the essential prohibition on the threat or use of force for the same ends; and third, by declaring that any attempt to disrupt a state's unity, territory, or independence is incompatible with the UN Charter.

Under Principle 1[25] of the Friendly Relations Declaration Resolution, 

“Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.

Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence.

Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.”

These provisions demonstrate the international community's clear condemnation and comprehensive prohibition of the use of force. States are under a strict obligation to refrain from the use of force against another state. This prohibition explicitly extends to the sending of irregular forces or armed bands into another state's territory. 

The International Court of Justice has expressed it displeasure and condemned act of breaches of territorial integrity and political independence in the case of Albania v. United Kingdom (Merits)[26] (The Corfu Channel Case) where the court stated that violations of territorial integrity cannot “find a place in international law”. The continued that “…Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”[27]

IV. THE ISSUE OF NON-INTERVENTION

The principle of non-intervention or prohibition of intervention by states in another state is curated in customary international law. It is one of the widely recognised principles in international law. An act of intervention has to interfere with a state’s internal or external affairs. Such affairs are frequently referred to in the literature as the state’s domaine réservé (reserved domain).[28] The issue of the lawfulness or legitimacy of "external" intervention in the "internal" affairs of sovereign states is one of the most basic controversies in modern international law.  As Oppenheim's International Law puts it, "the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in question…” 

The domestic jurisdiction of states includes those areas that international law does not reach and that in some circumstances international law should actively protect against the improper interventions of others. Domestic jurisdiction begins where international jurisdiction ends and embraces those areas not appropriate for international control.[29] The reserved domain is the object of prohibited intervention.[30] The ICJ stated in the Nicaragua v. United States of America[31] that it encompasses those “matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.” The United Nations is barred from intervening in matters that are “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.[32]

To further secure territorial integrity and political independence, the Friendly Relations Declaration, in Principle 3,[33] prohibits intervention by states in the internal affairs of another state. It provides that:

“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”

This provision is similar to the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention

in the Domestic Affairs of States.[34] Which provides that:

“no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.”

Also, Article 3 of the of the International Law Commission’s Draft Declaration on Right and Duties of States 1949 provides that “Every Stale has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” It is therefore forbidden for other states to intervene in matters that are within the territorial boundaries of another state.

President Trump's statement constitutes a clear violation of the principles enshrined in the in Article 2(4) and (7) of the UN Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration. By threatening to intervene militarily in Nigeria—a sovereign state—over a perceived internal matter, the action directly contravenes the prohibition on interfering in another state's domestic affairs. Such a declaration disregards Nigeria's territorial integrity and political independence, which grants it the exclusive right to address security issues within its own borders. The threat of external force, therefore, represents a fundamental challenge to the core tenets of international law.

The ICJ recognised in the Nicaragua v. United States of America[35]that the principle of non-intervention, 

“forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force…”[36]

Again the court noted that there was substantial overlap between the prohibitions

on the use of force and intervention, holding that coercion “is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State [. . . and that these] forms of action are therefore wrongful in the light of both the principle of non-use of force, and that of non-intervention.” The Court therefore concluded that “…the direct attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations, etc. not only amount to an unlawful use of force, but also constitute infringements of the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua, and incursions into its territorial and internal waters.”[37]

The ICJ took similar view in the case of Congo v Uganda.[38] The ICJ concluded that

“Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the DRC. Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC and in the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.”[39]

The prohibition of intervention "is a corollary of every state's right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence".[40] Having evolved from customary international law to become enshrined in treaty provisions, the principle of non-intervention is now universally regarded by states as an absolute and non-negotiable tenet of the international order.

However, over the years States have breached these principles and justified the breach on the basis of protecting it nationals abroad. For instance the action by the United Kingdom (with France) in landing forces in Egypt in 1956 to protect British nationals endangered by the consequences of Israel's attack on Egypt; the landing of Belgian forces in the Congo in 1960 to protect mainly Belgian nationals when law and order had broken down at a time of civil disturbances; the landing of Israeli commandos at Entebbe Airport, Uganda in 1976 to free the passengers (mostly Israeli nationals) of a hijacked aircraft; the landing of Egyptian forces at Lanarka Airport, Cyprus in 1978 to rescue Egyptian and other hostages held by terrorists in a hijacked aircraft; the landing of French and Belgian forces, with medical support facilities provided by the UK and air transport provided by US, in Shaba Province of Zaire in 1978, to protect Belgian and other European National nationals endangered by rebel activities in the province.[41]

The threatened intervention by the White House is distinct from a conventional operation to protect or rescue American nationals, as there have been no reported cases of U.S. citizens being held hostage in the affected regions. Instead, the primary justification articulated for the potential intervention is the prevention of what has been termed a "Christian genocide" within Nigeria. Consequently, the stated casus interventionis is rooted in the objective of protecting Nigerian Christian communities, rather than addressing a direct threat to American citizens.

This framing elevates the situation beyond a mere diplomatic concern to a potential justification for coercive action. It is critical to emphasize that the underlying context is a matter of Nigeria's internal security. From the perspective of public international law, any unilateral military intervention or deployment of U.S. troops on this basis would constitute a clear breach of fundamental international norms. Specifically, such an action would violate the customary international law principle of non-intervention, which safeguards a state's sovereign affairs from external coercion. This violation would, in turn, directly infringe upon the twin pillars of state sovereignty: the territorial integrity and political independence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

V. INTERVENTION BY INVITATION OR APPEAL FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

The legal concept of 'intervention by invitation' denotes the provision of military assistance by one or more states to an incumbent government, contingent upon that government's prior and valid consent.[42] The primary objective of such an intervention is typically to bolster the requesting state in its conflict against non-state actors or other armed groups operating within its sovereign territory.

The doctrine of intervention by invitation is substantiated by extensive state practice, both preceding and following the Second World War. Prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, historical examples include French and Spanish intervention in the American War of Independence (1775–1783), the actions of the Holy Alliance (1815), Great Britain's intervention in Portugal (1826), and Russia's intervention at the request of Austria during the Hungarian uprising (1848–49), as well as various foreign involvements in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39).[43]

This practice continued throughout the Cold War era (1947–1991). Both the United States and the Soviet Union frequently intervened in states within their respective spheres of influence, justifying their actions, in part, by reference to real or alleged invitations from the host government. Prominent examples of this dynamic include Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956), the collective Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968), and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979). This pattern demonstrates the enduring, though frequently contested, invocation of consent to legitimize the use of force within the bilateral relations of states.[44]

While the United Nations Charter does not explicitly mention the concept of 'intervention by invitation,' the validity of consent as a justification for the cross-border use of force is now a well-established principle. This justification is not derived from the Charter's provisions on self-defence under Article 51, but rather operates as a distinct circumstance that precludes the wrongfulness of an intervention that would otherwise violate the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). Consequently, when a host state issues a valid request for military assistance, the intervening state's action is not considered an "act of aggression" or a breach of sovereignty, but a lawful response to a sovereign decision.

The prevailing view in international legal scholarship holds that a validly executed intervention by invitation falls outside the scope of the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter .[45] This legal position is grounded in the principle of state sovereignty, which confers upon states the exclusive right to dispose of their territory. A logical extension of this sovereignty is the right to consent to military operations by other states within their borders.[46] Consequently, where such consent is validly granted, the maxim volenti non fit iniuria—to one who is willing, no wrong is done—applies, rendering the prohibition of Article 2(4) inapplicable.[47]

Under this framework, military compliance with a host state's request is not considered an act directed against the 'territorial integrity or political independence' of that state, as it is undertaken with its sovereign authorization. Furthermore, such an action, when conducted in support of a recognized government, is not inherently incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations as outlined in Article 2(4).

For an intervention by invitation to be lawful, the proffered consent must be validly attributable to the incumbent government of the host state. The authority to issue an invitation for direct military assistance is a sovereign prerogative, vested in the state's highest executive representatives.[48] As such, valid consent must be expressed by the head of state, head of government, or minister of foreign affairs, who are presumed under international law to possess the competence to bind the state in such matters.[49]

A fundamental limitation on the doctrine of intervention by invitation is that a request from non-state actors, most notably from an internal opposition group or bodies lacking the requisite constitutional authority or members of a prior, ousted government, or from sub-state entities such as local authorities, military or intelligence officials acting without a central mandate, or dissident groups, does not constitute a legal basis for military intervention.[50]

This principle was authoritatively confirmed by the ICJ the Nicaragua case. The Court explicitly rejected the existence of a "right for States to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another State."[51] The ICJ highlighted the logical and legal absurdity of allowing such a practice, stating:

“It is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition. This would permit any State to intervene at any moment in the internal affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government or at the request of its opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court’s view correspond to the present state of international law."[52]

Thus, the ICJ firmly established that the legitimacy of an invitation is linked to the authority of the incumbent government, and consent from any other source cannot justify a cross-border use of force or intervention.

To align with the doctrine of intervention by invitation and ensure the legality of any external military action, the position advanced herein is for the Nigerian government to formally request military assistance from the United States. By issuing such a request, Nigeria would provide its full and sovereign consent for the U.S. to undertake military operations within its borders to combat the non-state actors perpetrating the widespread violence against Christian communities.

Provided this request is validly extended by the incumbent government of Nigeria and duly accepted by the United States, the subsequent military cooperation would not constitute a breach of Nigeria’s territorial integrity or political independence. Rather, it would be an exercise of Nigeria's sovereign right to seek external support in maintaining internal order. Consequently, such an invited intervention, being based on valid consent, would fall outside the scope of the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Therefore, far from being unlawful, the actions of the United States, conducted under this framework, would be considered lawful under contemporary international law.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the legal analysis above, the threatened U.S. military intervention in Nigeria is unlawful under international law. It constitutes a clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force against a state's territorial integrity and political independence, a cornerstone of the UN Charter. The threat itself breaches the principle of non-intervention in matters essentially within Nigeria's domestic jurisdiction. The stated justification of protecting a religious group, absent a UN Security Council mandate or an imminent threat to American nationals, provides no legal basis for such unilateral action. The only potential path to legality would be a formal, valid invitation from the sovereign Nigerian government. As no such consent exists, the proposed intervention remains an unlawful act of aggression, undermining the very foundations of the post-World War II international legal order.

[1] The Covenant of the League of Nations was the charter of the League of Nations. It was signed on 28 June 1919 as Part I of the Treaty of Versailles, and became effective together with the rest of the Treaty on 10 January 1920.

[2] Nico Schrijver, ‘The Use of Force under the UN Charter: Restrictions and Loopholes’ (2003). The ACUNS 2003 John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture. 

[3] Many countries signed the League of Nations Covenant, but ratification varied, with some nations failing to ratify, while others ratified later. Initial signatories that also ratified by January 10, 1920, included Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, France, Italy, Japan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Siam, and Uruguay, along with the British Empire on behalf of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India. China, Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Portugal ratified the Covenant in 1920 as well. 

[4] Preamble, see also art. 10 of the Covenant.

[5] Nico Schrijver, ‘The Use of Force under the UN Charter: Restrictions and Loopholes’ (2003). The ACUNS 2003 John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture. 

[6] See Ademola Abass, Complete International Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press (2nd Edn. 2014), p. 335.

[7] The Pact was named after its authors, US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand.

[8] United States, France, Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, Irish Free State, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Japan.

[9] Art. 1 of the Kellog Briand Pact 1928.

[10] General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy.

[11] Ademola Abass, Complete International Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford University Press (2nd Edn. 2014) p. 336

[12] Ibid.

[13] Preamble of the UN Charter.

[14] The UN Charter is the foundational treaty that established the United Nations, signed on June 26, 1945. It serves as the UN's "constitution," outlining the organization's purposes, principles, and governing structure.

[15] Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 29 (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2008).

[16] Yoram Dinstein, ‘War, Aggression and Self Defence Cambridge’ Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[17] Ibid.

[18] A. Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’ in B. Simma et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[19] It provides that “No State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.”

[20] Samuel K N Blay, Territorial Integrity and Political Independence (2011) MPEPIL.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See Oppenheim’s International Law (9th Edn. 1992).

[23] Samuel K N Blay, Territorial Integrity and Political Independence (2011) MPEPIL.

[24] Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 [XXV].

[25] The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

[26] (1949) ICJ REP 4.

[27] pp. 4, 35.

[28] Marko Milanovic, ‘Revisiting Coercion As An Element Of Prohibited Intervention In International Law’ (2023) Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/ajil.2023.40

[29] M.N.S. Sellers, ‘Intervention Under International Law’, Maryland Journal of International Law Volume 29 (2014).

[30] Marko Milanovic, ‘Revisiting Coercion As An Element Of Prohibited Intervention In International Law’ (2023) Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/ajil.2023.40

[31] (1986) ICJ REP 14 (The Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, or the Nicaragua Case),para. 205.

[32] Art. 2(7) of the UN Charter.

[33] The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter.

[34] General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX).

[35] (1986) ICJ REP 14 (The Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case, or the Nicaragua Case).

[36] Ibid, para. 205.

[37] Ibid, para. 251.

[38] Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 ICJ Rep. 168

[39] Ibid,  para. 165

[40] Oppenheim’s International Law (9th Edn. 1992), p. 428; also see the Nicaragua Case. 

[41] Oppenheim’s International Law (9th Edn. 1992), p. 440-441.

[42] Janina Barkholdt, Intervention by Invitation,  MPEPIL (OUP Oxford 2012) vol VI, 282–89).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45]  See Corten [2021] 250. 

[46] See The ILA’s 2018 report on aggression and the use of force.

[47] Janina Barkholdt, Intervention by Invitation,  MPEPIL (OUP Oxford 2012) vol VI, 282–89).

[48] The ILA’s 2018 report on aggression and the use of force.

[49] See Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.

[50] See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) Judgment, 2005 ICJ Rep. 168.

[51] para. 206

[52] para. 246